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The rule of law is undermined when political and personal interests motivate 
criminal prosecutions. This report advances proposals for ensuring that the 
federal criminal justice system is administered uniformly based on the facts and 
the law. It recommends a law preventing the president from interfering in specific 
prosecutions, another law establishing responsibilities for prosecutors who 
receive improper orders, and new conflict of interest regulations for Department 
of Justice officials. 
 
This report was researched and written during the 2018-2019 academic year by 
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is focused on developing non-partisan recommendations to strengthen the 
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Limitations on the president’s control over the DOJ find support 
in the Constitution and principles that undergird that legal 
system. The Constitution’s framers intended for the president 
to execute the laws in a manner consistent with the nation’s 
interests—not his political or personal interests. They also 
subjected the president’s powers to restrictions imposed by 
Congress. These principles are embodied in the Take Care 
Clause, which demands that the president “faithfully” executive 
the law, and the Executive Vesting Clause, which grants the 
president powers to carry out the responsibilities of his office. 
Additionally, the Necessary and Proper Clause gives Congress 
discretion to determine how the federal government’s powers 
are exercised.
Other checks on the president’s authority over the DOJ flow 
from prosecutors’ obligations. Prosecutors must follow the law 
over the president’s orders when the two come into conflict. 
The Supreme Court has held that prosecutors act as agents 
of the law—not of the president—when they act pursuant to 
authority Congress granted them, such as deciding whether 
to bring charges based on a criminal statute. Prosecutors have 
a quasi-judicial role, which means they must follow fair and 
neutral procedures. Furthermore, the Supreme Court has held 
that they have an obligation to act in the public interest.
We recommend three reforms to prevent the president and 
other White House officials from interfering in the neutral 
administration of the federal criminal justice system. Proposal 
1 calls for legislation prohibiting the president and other White 
House personnel from influencing decisions related to the 
investigation or prosecution of any individual, except where 
a core executive function, such as defending against national 
security threats, is implicated. Because Congress granted 
the executive branch authority to handle prosecutions, it can 
regulate how that power is exercised. The proposed legislation 
would preserve the president’s discretion to set general law 
enforcement priorities.
Proposal 2 aims to prohibit prosecutors from acting on 
improper directives from the White House. The first aspect 
of this proposal is a law codifying the guidelines in the DOJ’s 
Justice Manual that instruct prosecutors on conducting 
investigations and prosecutions. The guidelines emphasize 
prosecutors’ quasi-judicial role and their responsibility to 
neutrally seek justice. In addition to emphasizing prosecutors’ 
responsibilities, codification of the guidelines could provide legal 
recourse to parties whose rights are violated by prosecutors 
pursuing political aims. The second aspect of Proposal 2 calls 
for legislation stating that prosecutors have a duty to not resign 
in the face of improper orders. Rather, prosecutors should 
Executive Summary
The Department of Justice is not sufficiently insulated from 
political interference. Political intrusion on prosecutorial 
decision-making undermines independence in criminal law 
enforcement, the principle of the rule of law, and public 
confidence in our legal system. These values are at the core 
of our system of government. This report outlines a range of 
reforms to ensure that specific prosecutions are not unduly 
impacted by political considerations.
Even before President Trump faced accusations of obstructing 
the Department of Justice’s investigation into his campaign’s 
ties to Russia, other presidents improperly interfered with DOJ 
investigations and prosecutions. Questions about the degree 
to which the president may control the federal criminal law 
enforcement process reach back to the nation’s earliest years. 
Orders from Presidents George Washington and Thomas 
Jefferson relating to certain criminal matters did not engender 
any controversy, but only decades later some attorneys general 
began asserting that prosecutors were independent actors 
whose primary obligation was to the law, not presidential 
directives. Congress created the modern DOJ in 1870, and 
norms and regulations have since developed to protect its 
independence, including policies to regulate communications 
between the White House and DOJ.
Perhaps the most notable example of presidential interference 
with the Department of Justice came during the Watergate 
scandal in the early 1970s when President Richard Nixon fired 
the special prosecutor investigating Nixon’s 1972 presidential 
campaign. Nixon dismissed the special prosecutor after he 
subpoenaed tapes of Oval Office conversations.
In 2006, President George W. Bush’s administration faced 
criticism that it dismissed seven U.S. attorneys for pursuing 
cases that did not advance the administration’s agenda. 
The DOJ’s independent watchdog concluded “there was 
significant evidence that political partisan considerations” 
impacted the firings.
Following the Watergate and Bush-era incidents, reform 
proposals called for additional measures to insulate the DOJ 
from political interference. Senator Sam Ervin, who chaired the 
committee that investigated Watergate, proposed legislation 
that would have limited the president’s ability to remove the 
attorney general by establishing a six-year term for the position.  
But the idea encountered substantial resistance, largely 
on the basis that it would separate law enforcement from 
democratic accountability. More recently, some scholars have 
proposed electing the attorney general. The 2006 U.S. attorney 
dismissals prompted Congress to consider legislation to codify 
regulations of White House-DOJ communications.
4 Toward an Independent Administration of Justice
decline to take the improper action and report the directive to 
the DOJ’s Inspector General.
Proposal 3 recommends allowing the Office of Government 
Ethics to use rulemaking and case-by-case adjudication 
to gradually establish non-financial guidelines for when 
prosecutors should recuse themselves from certain matters. 
The OGE should have the authority to determine when 
prosecutors’ non-financial interests pose a “significant risk” to 
the public interest such that recusal is required. The standard 
for what constitutes a “significant risk” would be determined 
over time through reference to the office’s case-by-case 
determinations.
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President Donald Trump’s attempts to influence the 
investigation of his campaign’s ties to Russia1 and his related 
assertion that he has “absolute” control over the Department 
of Justice (“DOJ”)2 have renewed questions about the degree 
to which the president can control the enforcement of criminal 
law. Similar questions have existed since George Washington’s 
presidency. This report draws on history, case law, and ethical 
obligations to demonstrate why Trump’s assertion that he 
has an absolute right to control DOJ investigations is wrong. 
The report then sets forth three proposals to strengthen the 
independent enforcement of criminal law at the federal level. 
The United States Constitution reflects a set of carefully 
considered judgments about the allocation of institutional 
authority within the federal government. The framers provided 
for a diffuse power distribution among the three branches of 
government. The Constitution places some powers within the 
exclusive domain of one branch, while other powers, such as the 
War Powers, were to be shared among the branches. However, 
concerns exist that the framers’ design has failed to prevent, 
and perhaps facilitated, the occurrence of their greatest fear: the 
concentration of governmental power in the executive branch. 
Actions and statements by President Trump3 have caused legal 
scholars and lawmakers to once again evaluate whether the DOJ 
is sufficiently insulated from political interference.4 The DOJ’s 
ability to function within the constitutional framework 
established by the framers is premised on a belief that decisions 
related to criminal law enforcement are based on fact and law.5 
1 See 2 ROBERT S. MUELLER, III, SPECIAL COUNSEL’S OFF., U.S. DEP’T OF JUST., REPORT 
ON THE INVESTIGATION INTO RUSSIAN INTERFERENCE IN THE 2016 PRESIDENTIAL ELECTION 
4 (2019); Mark Mazzetti et al., Intimidation, Pressure and Humiliation: Inside 
Trump’s Two-Year War on the Investigations Encircling Him, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 
19, 2019, https://www.nytimes.com/2019/02/19/us/politics/trump-
investigations.html.
2 See Michael S. Schmidt & Michael D. Shear, Trump Says Russia Inquiry Makes 
U.S. ‘Look Very Bad’, N.Y. TIMES (Dec. 28, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/2017/ 
12/28/us/politics/trump-interview-mueller-russia-china-north-korea.html.
3 Id; see generally MUELLER, supra note 1.
4 See PROTECT DEMOCRACY, No “Absolute Right” to Control DOJ: Constitutional Limits 
on White House Interference with Law Enforcement Matters (March 2018), 
https://protectdemocracy.org/resource-library/document/no-absolute-
right-control-doj/; Bruce A. Green & Rebecca Roiphe, Can The President 
Control The Department Of Justice?, 70 ALA. L. REV. 1 (2018)  [hereinafter 
Can The President Control]; Andrew McCanse Wright, Justice Department 
Independence and White House Control 27-28 (Feb. 18, 2018), https://
ssrn.com/abstract=3125848; Jed Shugerman, Think Matthew Whitaker 
is a hack? He’s one of many, WASH. POST (Nov. 16, 2018), https://www.
washingtonpost.com/opinions/think-matthew-whitaker-is-a-hack-hes-one-
of-many/2018/11/16/5efbf47c-e8f7-11e8-b8dc-66cca409c180_story.html.
5 See Erik Larson, Sally Yates Calls Trump’s Attempt to Undermine Faith in 
Institutions ‘Dangerous’, BLOOMBERG (Nov. 28, 2018), https://www.bloomberg.
com/news/articles/2018-11-28/trump-s-bid-to-sap-faith-in-institutions-
dangerous-yates-says (quoting Sally Yates, “The Department of Justice 
really can only function if the citizens of this country respect and believe 
that decisions are being based on the facts and the law and nothing else.”).
Respecting facts and the law is essential to preventing the 
exercise of government power for political purposes.6 
Increasingly, however, partisanship and ideology challenge the 
norm of DOJ independence and the rule of law narrative that 
underlies support for the institution.7 If fact and law are 
displaced by political whims as the basis for DOJ decision 
making, the corresponding loss of faith in the rule of law 
principles will undermine the entirety of American democracy.8
To strengthen DOJ independence, principles of rule of law, and 
American democracy, this report brings to light the deficiencies 
and misunderstandings with respect to presidential control of 
the DOJ. This report also sets forth reforms aimed at curtailing 
the subtle, as well as brazen, abuses of DOJ power that have 
become increasingly common. Such abuses can undermine 
the values of independence in criminal law enforcement,9 the 
principle of the rule of law,10 and public confidence in our legal 
system.11
This report is divided into three parts. Part I briefly describes the 
history of the Department of Justice, including past instances of 
presidential interference with criminal prosecution, and outlines 
significant past reform proposals to prevent improper political 
interference. Part II provides a framework for understanding 
the functions of the presidency and how those functions relate 
to other provisions of the Constitution. Part III then proposes 
a series of reforms. These proposals focus on prohibiting the 
president from interfering with DOJ processes; making it clear 
that prosecutors who receive improper orders must not resign 
and must report the improper command to the DOJ’s inspector 
general; and gradually defining non-financial recusal guidelines 
for prosecutors. All three of these proposals have a narrow 
exception permitting limited presidential oversight on individual 
prosecutions that implicate core executive functions, including 
protecting the security of the United States from domestic and 
foreign threats.
6 See Daphna Renan, Presidential Norms and Article II, 131 HARV. L. REV. 2187, 
2193 (2018).
7 See id. at 2240.
8 See id. 
9 MUELLER, supra note 1, at 112; see Michael S. Schmidt & Maggie Haberman, 
Trump Wanted to Order Justice Dept. to Prosecute Comey and Clinton, N.Y. 
TIMES, Nov. 20, 2018, https://www.nytimes.com/2018/11/20/us/politics/
president-trump-justice-department.html (noting that Trump’s attempt to 
prosecute his political adversaries served as a “blatant” example of “how 
Mr. Trump views the typically independent Justice Department as a tool to 
be wielded against his political enemies”). 
10 See id. (noting that “Presidential meddling [in criminal cases] could 
undermine the legitimacy of prosecutions by attaching political overtones 
to investigations in which career law enforcement officials followed the 
evidence and the law.”).
11 See id. 
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The Justice Department’s structure and its approach to criminal 
prosecutions have evolved in significant ways over the course of 
the nation’s history. Notable proposals for further change have 
come mostly in response to instances where presidents and 
politics improperly impacted law enforcement.
A.  Debate Over the Relationship Between 
the President and DOJ
The early relationship between the president and federal 
prosecutors is the subject of debate in the legal community.  
As Griffith Bell, attorney general under President Jimmy Carter, 
noted, “From the inception of the Office of the Attorney General 
. . . there has been ambiguity about the role, and disagreement 
about the independence, of the Attorney General.”12 Some 
scholars, including Kate Andrias13 and Sai Prakash,14 identify 
particular historical interventions by presidents in federal 
prosecutions to support an unbounded conception of executive 
power over law enforcement.15 Others contend that the lack of a 
centralized agency for the nation’s first 100 years supports a 
more limited conception of authority.16 For example, Bruce 
Green17 and Rebecca Roiphe18 suggest “rather than possessing 
plenary authority over criminal prosecution, presidents could 
supersede ordinary prosecutorial independence only in cases 
where enumerated presidential powers were implicated.”19  
Eric Posner,20 in testimony before the Senate Judiciary 
Committee, identified two reasons “[t]he founders never 
believed that the president should be given ‘complete control’ 
12 Griffin B. Bell, The Attorney General: The Federal Government’s Chief Lawyer 
and Chief Litigator, or One Among Many?, 46 FORDHAM L. REV. 1049, 1065 
(1978).
13 Professor of Law, University of Michigan Law School.
14 James Monroe Distinguished Professor of Law and Paul G. Mahoney 
Research Professor of Law, University of Virginia School of Law.
15 Kate Andrias, The President’s Enforcement Power, 88 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1031 
(2013); Saikrishna Prakash, The President’s Power to Execute the Laws, 104 
YALE L. J. 541 (1994).
16 William B. Gwyn, The Indeterminacy of the Separation of Powers and the 
Federal Courts, 57 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 474, 490-94 (1989); Lawrence Lessig 
& Cass Sunstein, The President and The Administration, 94 COLUM. L. REV. 1, 
14-22 (1994).
17 Louis Stein Chair of Law, Fordham University School of Law.
18 Professor of Law, New York Law School.
19 Can The President Control, supra note 4, at 15.
20 Kirkland & Ellis Distinguished Service Professor, University of Chicago Law 
School.
over law enforcement.”21 The first reason Posner identified is the 
scattering of federal law enforcement “among many different 
agents, including federal officers who were not directly 
controlled by the president, state officials, and private 
citizens.”22 Second, Posner identified provisions of the 
Constitution that do not support total control over law 
enforcement, including: “involving the Senate in appointments; 
giving budgetary authority to Congress, which it can use to 
influence law-enforcement priorities; and allowing Congress to 
define executive-branch offices.”23 The lack of clarity 
surrounding the permissible limits of presidential influence of 
DOJ activities has led to concerns about the permissible scope 
of presidential involvement in criminal prosecutions of specific 
individuals. 
B. History of the DOJ
The modern Department of Justice did not come into existence 
until nearly a century after the nation’s founding, when a far less 
centralized approach to criminal prosecutions was abandoned.
1. Attorney General in the Early Republic
The Judiciary Act of 1789 created the Office of the Attorney 
General as a largely judicial office with a far more limited 
mandate than the modern DOJ. Initially, the attorney general 
had only two duties: representing the United States as a party 
before the Supreme Court and answering legal questions 
submitted by the president or the heads of executive 
departments.24 The Judiciary Act vested authority to prosecute 
suits on behalf of the United States in “[p]erson[s] learned in 
the law [appointed] to act as attorney for the United States” 
in each judicial district.25 These positions were precursors of 
the modern U.S. attorneys but were not subject to attorney 
21 Special Counsels and the Separation of Powers: Hearing Before the S. Comm. 
on the Judiciary, 115th Cong. (2017) (statement of Eric Posner, Professor of 
Law, University of Chicago), https://www.judiciary.senate.gov/imo/media/
doc/09-26-17%20Posner%20Testimony.pdf. Similarly, Protect Democracy, 
a non-partisan nonprofit formed to hold the executive branch accountable 
to law and longstanding democratic practice, also notes that “[i]ncluding 
the Opinions Clause would have made little sense if the Framers meant to 
grant the President full authority to reach into the Departments to direct 
their activities.” See PROTECT DEMOCRACY, supra note 4, at 13.
22 Special Counsels and the Separation of Powers, supra note 21.
23 Id.
24 Judiciary Act of 1789 § 35, ch. 20, 1 Stat. 73.
25 Id. During this period, private citizens and state officials were also 
empowered to enforce federal law in court. See Lessig & Sunstein, supra 
note 16, at 19 n. 76, 77 and accompanying text.
I. DOJ History, Presidential Interference, and  
Previous Reform Proposals
 Democracy Clinic 7
general control until 1861.26 Congress likely neglected to provide 
a process for appointing the attorney general and district 
attorneys with the expectation that the appointment power 
would fall to the president as a result of the statute’s silence on 
the point. 
Presidential involvement in individual prosecutions was largely 
non-controversial in the early days of the Republic. For example, 
between 1792 and 1793, President George Washington 
ordered the prosecution of Whiskey Rebellion participants. 
Concluding that two defendants were wrongly accused, 
Washington ordered William Rawle, the U.S. Attorney for the 
District of Pennsylvania, to drop the prosecutions.27 President 
Thomas Jefferson, who considered the Sedition Act of 1789 
to be unconstitutional, also ordered pending prosecutions 
under its provisions to be dismissed.28 Nevertheless, Jefferson 
simultaneously ordered a new prosecution against one of the 
defendants on alternative grounds to placate the Senate, which 
had sought the indictment.29 In a letter, Jefferson laid out his 
justification for the prosecution:
The President is to have the laws executed. He may order an 
offence then to be prosecuted. If he sees a prosecution put into 
a train which is not lawful, he may order it to be discontinued 
and put into a legal train . . . There appears to be no weak part 
in any of these positions or inferences.30
In 1831, while serving as President Andrew Jackson’s attorney 
general, future Chief Justice Roger B. Taney concluded that 
Jackson possessed authority to direct a federal district 
attorney to dismiss a forfeiture action and to return the jewels 
in question to the foreign royalty from whom they had been 
stolen.31 But he noted:
26 Act of Aug. 2, 1861, ch. 37, 12 Stat. 285. Previous suggestions to create 
attorney general supervision existed. For example, President Washington 
submitted a recommendation by Edmund Randolph to subject district 
attorneys to attorney general supervision in 1791 that was never enacted. 
3 ANNALS OF CONG. 53, 289, 329-30 (1791). Similar recommendations by 
Presidents Jackson and Polk were rejected in 1830 and 1845. Andrew 
Jackson, Second Annual Message (Dec. 6, 1830), in 2 A COMPILATION OF THE 
MESSAGES AND PAPERS OF THE PRESIDENTS, 1789-1908, at 500, 527-28 (James D. 
Richardson ed., 1908); HOMER CUMMINGS & CARL MCFARLAND, FEDERAL JUSTICE: 
CHAPTERS IN THE HISTORY OF JUSTICE AND THE FEDERAL EXECUTIVE 147-48 (1937).
27 Sai Prakash, The Chief Prosecutor, 73 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1701, 1738 (2005).
28 See, e.g., Letter from Thomas Jefferson to Wilson C. Nicholas 
(June 13, 1809), https://founders.archives.gov/documents/
Jefferson/03-01-02-0223; Letter from Thomas Jefferson to Edward 
Livingston (Nov. 1, 1801), https://founders.archives.gov/documents/
Jefferson/01-35-02-0451.
29 Prakash, supra note 27, at 1746.
30 Letter from Thomas Jefferson to Edward Livingston, supra note 28.
31 Andrias, supra note 15, at 1051-53.
The district attorney might refuse to obey the President’s 
order; and if he did refuse, the prosecution, while he remained 
in office, would still go on; because the President himself 
could give no order to the court or to the clerk to make any 
particular entry. He could only act through his subordinate 
officer, the district attorney, who is responsible to him and 
who holds his office at his pleasure. And if that officer still 
continues a prosecution which the President is satisfied ought 
not to continue, the removal of the disobedient officer and the 
substitution of one more worthy in his place would enable the 
President through him faithfully to execute the law.32
By the 1850s, the nature of the Office of the Attorney General 
began to transform. President Franklin Pierce’s attorney 
general, Caleb Cushing, is credited as the first attorney general 
to recognize the evolution of the Office of Attorney General 
from an “quasi-judicial” office to an executive department. In 
an opinion, he acknowledged that “a sense of subordination 
has come to exist . . . with regard to the directory power of the 
President.”33 However, subsequent attorneys general, such as 
Edward Bates, who served under President Abraham Lincoln, 
did not view this subordination as absolute. Bates noted in his 
diary that the position was not “properly political, but strictly 
legal; and it [was his] duty above all other ministers of State to 
uphold the Law and to resist all encroachments, from whatever 
quarter, of mere will and power.”34
2. The Birth of the Modern DOJ
The motives behind the creation of the modern DOJ in 187035 
are not clear. Robert Kaczoworski36 theorizes that the modern 
DOJ was created to help address the “workload crisis” from 
a “mushroom[ing]” post-Civil War federal court caseload, 
which necessitated the hiring of expensive private attorneys.37 
Alternatively, Norm Spaulding,38 hypothesizes that the creation 
of the DOJ was intended to help enforce former slaves’ civil 
32 The Jewels of the Princess of Orange, 2 Op. Att’y Gen. 482 (1831).
33 CORNELL W. CLAYTON, THE POLITICS OF JUSTICE: THE ATTORNEY GENERAL AND THE 
MAKING OF LEGAL POLICY 50 n. 16 (1992); Henry Barrett Learned, The Attorney-
General and the Cabinet, 24 POL. SCI. Q. 444, 458 (1909). See 6 Op. Att’y 
Gen. 326, 332-33, 340-41 (1854) (stating the duties of the Office of the 
Attorney General following his first year in the role). “Cushing’s exhaustive 
analysis of the origin and duties of his position has been accepted by 
the later incumbents as constituting the authoritative statement on the 
subject.” 2 CLAUDE M. FUESS, LIFE OF CALEB CUSHING 182 (1923).
34 THE DIARY OF EDWARD BATES, 1859-1866, at 350 (Howard K. Beale, ed.).
35 Act to Establish the Department of Justice, ch. 150, 16 Stat. 162 (1870).
36 Professor of Law, Fordham Law School.
37 ROBERT J. KACZOROWSKI, THE POLITICS OF JUDICIAL INTERPRETATION: THE FEDERAL 
COURTS, DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE, AND CIVIL RIGHTs, 1866-1876 39-40 (2005).
38 Sweitzer Professor of Law, Stanford Law School.
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rights during Reconstruction.39 Jed Shugerman’s view differs 
from Kaczorowski and Spaulding’s conceptions. Shugerman 
instead suggests the modern DOJ was part of budget-cutting 
and anti-patronage retrenchment “to shrink and professionalize 
the federal government” and was a first step in “the rise of 
bureaucratic autonomy and expertise.”40 This theory presents 
the creation of the modern DOJ as a “structural reform aiming 
to protect professional independence and separate law from 
politics.”41
However, Shugerman characterizes this structural reform and 
consolidation as a “false start towards independence.”42 Even 
after the purported centralization of prosecutions, Congress 
continued to grant independent litigation authority to other 
agencies, including the Department of the Interior and Post 
Office Department in 1872,43 the Department of Agriculture 
in 1889,44 and the Department of Labor and the Department 
of Commerce in 1913.45 In 1918, President Woodrow Wilson 
formally consolidated legal work within the DOJ,46 but Congress 
still granted agencies, such as the Interstate Commerce 
Commission, independent representation authority.47 Therefore, 
in 1933, President Franklin D. Roosevelt signed Executive 
Order 6166 which required, except as otherwise authorized by 
statute, that all claims brought by or against the United States 
be litigated by DOJ.48 Congress enacted legislation in 1966 to 
codify Executive Order 6166.49 
C. Examples of Presidential Interference 
One of the most infamous cases of presidential interference 
with the DOJ occurred during the Nixon administration. 
39 Norman W. Spaulding, Independence and Experimentalism in the Department 
of Justice, 63 STAN. L. REV. 409, 438 (2011).
40 Jed Handelsman Shugerman, The Creation of the Department of Justice: 
Professionalization Without Civil Rights or Civil Service, 66 STAN. L. REV. 121,  
121-25 (2014).
41 Id. at 126.
42 Id. at 170 (noting that “[b]efore and after the passage of the DOJ Act, 
principal law officers were still protected by the Tenure of Office Act. It 
was no easier for the President to direct the far-flung U.S. Attorneys, and 
in reality, it was no easier for the President to direct other law officers who 
were still dispersed around Washington.”).
43 Act of February 25, 1871, 16 Stat. 432; Act of June 8, 1872, 17 Stat. 284.
44 Act of Feb. 9, 1889, 25 Stat. 659.
45 Act of Mar. 4, 1913, ch. 141, 37 Stat. 736.
46 Exec. Order No. 2,877 (1918).
47 Transportation Act of 1920 § 3, ch. 250, 41 Stat. 92.
48 President Roosevelt acted pursuant to the provisions of the Economy Act of 
1932. 31 U.S.C. § 1535 (2016).
49 Act of Sept. 6, 1966, 80 Stat. 613 (codified at 28 U.S.C. § 516).
During the Watergate scandal,50 the appointed special 
prosecutor, Archibald Cox, was empowered to investigate “all 
offenses arising out of the 1972 election.”51 Cox was granted 
sole discretion to decide “whether and to what extent he 
[would] inform or consult with the attorney general” on the 
investigation.52 Cox subpoenaed secretly recorded tapes from 
the White House, leading President Richard Nixon to order 
Attorney General Elliot Richardson to fire Cox.53 This began 
a chain reaction known as “The Saturday Night Massacre.”54 
Richardson refused the order and resigned.55 Nixon then 
ordered Deputy Attorney General William Ruckelshaus to fire 
Cox. Ruckelshaus also refused and resigned.56 Finally, Solicitor 
General Robert Bork, the third-ranking DOJ official, became 
acting attorney general and fired Cox.57 Years later, Richardson 
and Ruckelshaus admitted that they urged Bork not to resign 
out of concern for DOJ continuity and fear that the chain 
reaction of resignations could end up with the “messenger 
service as Acting Attorney General.”58 
Allegations of improper White House interference also engulfed 
President George W. Bush’s administration. On December 7, 
2006, the DOJ ordered the dismissal of seven U.S. attorneys,59 
a move considered atypical in the middle of a president’s 
term.60 In an op-ed published in USA Today, Attorney General 
50 The Watergate scandal began when men associated with the reelection 
campaign of President Nixon were caught breaking in to the Democratic 
National Committee headquarters at the Watergate building complex 
in Washington, DC. “Watergate” also now refers to various illegal and 
clandestine activities undertaken by the administration against political 
opponents spurring congressional inquiry and eventually the resignation of 
President Nixon prior to impeachment. 
51 38 Fed. Reg. 14688 (June 4, 1973).
52 Id.
53 Carroll Kilpatrick, Nixon Forces Firing of Cox; Richardson, Ruckelshaus Quit, 





58 See Kenneth B. Noble, New Views Emerge of Bork’s Role in Watergate 
Dismissals, N.Y. TIMES, July 26, 1987, https://www.nytimes.com/1987/07/26/
us/new-views-emerge-of-bork-s-role-in-watergate-dismissals.html.
59 It was later discovered that two additional U.S. attorneys were 
earlier relieved of their posts earlier under similarly controversial 
circumstances. U.S. DEP’T OF JUST. OFF. OF THE INSPECTOR GEN. & OFF. OF 
PROF. RESP., AN INVESTIGATION INTO THE REMOVAL OF NINE U.S. ATTORNEYS IN 
2006 14 (Sept. 2008), https://www.justice.gov/sites/default/files/opr/
legacy/2008/09/30/us-att-firings-rpt092308.pdf.
60 The request for resignation and termination of U.S. attorneys at the 
beginning of a president’s tenure is the norm. See Leon Neyfakh, Yes, Trump 
and Sessions Just Cleaned House at the DOJ. No, It’s Not Shocking, SLATE (Mar. 
10, 2017, 6:53 PM), https://slate.com/news-and-politics/2017/03/46-u-s-
attorneys-are-asked-to-resign-as-trump-and-sessions-clean-house.html.
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Alberto Gonzalez61 contended that the dismissals were due to 
“performance, not to politics” and “reasons related to policy, 
priorities and management.”62 However, members of Congress 
suggested that the seven U.S. attorneys were terminated for 
pursuing cases that did not advance Bush’s agenda.63 
The dismissed U.S. attorneys were succeeded by interim 
replacements who were eligible to serve without Senate 
confirmation for an indefinite period because of a recent 
legal change. Previously, the appointment of an interim U.S. 
attorney expired after 120 days.64 This move was attacked 
both as a Republican Party attempt to advance the careers of 
rising conservatives65 and as an attempt to thwart meaningful 
congressional participation in appointment decisions. These 
allegations led to congressional,66 departmental, and criminal67 
inquiries into whether the removals were intended to influence 
particular prosecutions. As part of these inquiries, the DOJ 
Inspector General and Office of Professional Responsibility,68 
completed a report in September 2008 that found the 
White House was involved in more than “merely approving” 
some of the dismissals.69 The report determined “there was 
significant evidence that political partisan considerations 
were an important factor” in dismissal processes it described 
61 80th Attorney General of the United States, appointed by President George 
W. Bush in February 2005.
62 Alberto R. Gonzales, They Lost My Confidence, USA TODAY, Mar. 7, 2007, 
at 10A. Gonzales further stated, “We have never asked a U.S. attorney 
to resign in an effort to retaliate against him or her or to inappropriately 
interfere with a public corruption case (or any other type of case, for that 
matter).” Id.
63 See, e.g., Preserving Prosecutorial Independence: Is the Justice Dept. Politicizing 
the Hiring and Firing of U.S. Attorneys?: Hearing Before the S. Comm. on 
the Judiciary, 110th Cong. (2007) [hereinafter Preserving Prosecutorial 
Independence].
64 The replacements were not subject to the 120-day limit due to a provision 
of the USA PATRIOT Act Improvement and Reauthorization Act of 2005. 
Public Law No. 109-77 § 502 (amending 28 U.S.C. § 546).
65 David M. Driesen, Firing U.S. Attorneys: An Essay, 60 ADMIN. L. REV. 707, 726 
(2008).
66 See Preserving Prosecutorial Independence, supra note 63.
67 See Letter from Assistant Attorney General Ronald Weichs to Judiciary 
Chairman John Conyers (July 21, 2010), https://lawprofessors.typepad.
com/files/assistant-ag-ronald-weichs-letter.pdf. Attorney General 
Michael Mukasey appointed Nora R. Dannehy, the acting U.S. attorney in 
Connecticut, to lead a criminal probe that ended in 2010. That investigation, 
which was limited to the Iglesias termination, determined that while the 
circumstances “be[spoke] undue sensitivity to politics on the part of DOJ 
officials who should answer not to partisan politics but to principles of 
fairness and justice” and “the actions of DOJ leadership were contrary to 
DOJ principles,” no criminal charges were warranted. Id.
68 U.S. DEP’T OF JUST. OFF. OF THE INSPECTOR GEN. & OFF. OF PROF. RESP., supra note 
59.
69 Id. at 337.
as “arbitrary” and “fundamentally flawed.”70 Additionally, the 
report noted the controversy “raised doubts about the integrity 
of Department prosecution decisions.”71
D.  Previous Proposals Regarding DOJ 
Structure and Communications Between 
DOJ and the White House
Proposals to insulate the DOJ from political interference have 
included structural changes and regulation of communications 
between the department and the White House.
1. Proposals for DOJ Structural Reform 
In the wake of the Watergate scandal, Senator Sam Ervin, who 
chaired the select committee that investigated Watergate, 
proposed legislation to create an independent DOJ. The 
bill would have limited the president’s power to remove the 
attorney general. Under this proposal the president would 
appoint the attorney general to a six-year term, subject to 
removal only “for good cause.”72 The attorney general would 
then appoint the FBI director as well as the U.S. attorneys and 
U.S. marshals for each judicial district.73 
This proposal faced strong opposition, and 14 of 17 witnesses 
testified that separating the DOJ from presidential control 
would violate the separation of powers doctrine.74 Former 
Supreme Court Justice Arthur Goldberg, who concurred in this 
assessment, opined that the greatest permissible protection 
70 Id. at 325, 356.
71 Id. at 358. For example, the report found that U.S. Attorney for the District 
of New Mexico David Iglesias was dismissed because of a desire among 
New Mexico Republicans, including U.S. Senator Pete Domenici, “to 
influence voter fraud prosecutions in a closely divided state [and] affect the 
timing of a public corruption case against a prominent Democrat in order to 
influence the outcome of an election.” Id. at 197.  
72 Removing Politics from the Administration of Justice: Hearings Before the 
Subcomm. on Separation of Powers of the S. Comm. on the Judiciary on S. 
2803 and S. 2978, 93rd Cong. 3 (1974) [hereinafter Removing Politics]. 
Years later, Judge Griffith Bell, President Carter’s first attorney general, 
prepared a memorandum advising on a definite term for the attorney 
general only removable only for malfeasance. In the memo he concluded 
the requested legislation was likely illegal and that “there is no method, 
short of a constitutional amendment, to separate the Attorney General 
from Presidential control.” Proposals Regarding an Independent Attorney 
General, 1 Op. O.L.C. 75 (1977).
73 Removing Politics, supra note 72.
74 Id. Witnesses included: Ted Sorenson, speechwriter and adviser to President 
John F. Kennedy; Nicholas Katzenbach, one of President Lyndon B. Johnson’s 
attorneys general; and former Supreme Court Justice Arthur Goldberg. 
Id. at III. The separation of powers doctrine reflects the constitutional 
distribution of political authority among the three branches of government: 
the legislative, the executive, and the judicial. JOHN C. KNECHTLE & CHRISTOPHER 
J. ROEDERER, MASTERING CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 28 (2d ed. 2015).
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against improper presidential actions was to appoint attorneys 
general who are “capable of saying to a President, no, the 
law does not permit this; I will not permit this; and you must 
not engage in activities such as have been contemplated.”75 
Other critics of the proposal questioned whether it was 
desirable to have federal law enforcement removed from 
democratic control and whether it was possible to remove 
“politics from politics” to formulate and enforce a view of 
“the law” independent of policy considerations.76 Voicing 
his disagreement with the legislation, Ted Sorenson, one of 
President Kennedy’s closest aides, argued: 
Politics is necessarily tied up with policy, with one’s concept of 
the public interest and response to the public will. A president 
who campaigns on a “law and order” issue, or a narcotics or 
civil rights or organized crime issue, must not be confronted 
with an attorney general of sharply differing views appointed 
for a fixed term by his predecessor.77
Other proposals also arose out of the Watergate scandal. For 
example, former Southern District of New York U.S. Attorney 
Whitney North Seymour, Jr. proposed to divide the DOJ 
by function.78 To him, the DOJ was flawed because of the 
expectation that the attorney general “serve two masters, [the 
president and the law,] at the same time.” Seymour therefore 
proposed the creation of an Office of Chief Prosecutor, which 
would direct “all of the existing civil and criminal litigation and 
law enforcement functions in the Department of Justice.”79 This 
new office would include the U.S. attorneys, and the president 
would retain the power to appoint them based on lists prepared 
by Circuit Nominating Commissions, comprised of appointees 
of the chief judges of the constituent courts.80
75 Removing Politics, supra note 72, at 63.
76 CLAYTON, supra note 33, at 105. 
77 Removing Politics, supra note 72, at 73. Sorenson further testified that “[l]
aw enforcement faces enough problems today without responsibility 
for it at the federal level being divided between the president’s men and 
the attorney general’s. Do not fragment that responsibility—fix it, on the 
President, where it belongs. How else can a President be held responsible 
for his own Constitutional obligation to take care that the laws be faithfully 
executed?” Id. at 19.
78 Id. at 216.
79 Id.
80 Id. at 218.
Proposals to restructure the DOJ have persisted.81 For example, 
several commentators, including Bruce Einhorn82 and Garrett 
Epps,83 have recently called for electing the attorney general.  
Many states already hold elections for their attorneys general.84 
Einhorn further proposed that the elected attorney general 
would appoint the FBI director and other officers, subject to 
the advice and consent of the Senate.  Einhorn and Epps argue 
that such “independent stewardship of the Justice Department 
would act as a counterweight to any abuse of power by the 
president or his political appointees.”85 While each of these 
proposals suggests that the solution to improper interference is 
to limit presidential authority by restructuring the DOJ, others 
have responded to these same concerns with less extreme 
proposals.  
2. Proposals to Govern DOJ-White House 
Communications
As a result of Watergate and the special prosecutor 
investigation, White House and DOJ leadership since the Ford 
administration have promulgated rules governing contact 
regarding investigations and enforcement actions. All of 
these policies share a set of common features: establishing 
the White House Counsel’s Office and Office of the Attorney 
General as primary gatekeepers for initial contact; restricting 
communications based on function rather than personnel; and 
requiring information to be important both for performance of 
the president’s duties and appropriate from a law enforcement 
perspective before any communication is condoned.86 The 
81 Professor Jed Shugerman of Fordham Law School has proposed two 
alternative schemas for enhanced independence: (1) requiring all major 
departmental decisions be ratified by a commission comprised of both 
senior agency officials still appointed and removed at will by the president 
and independent directors of both parties with long statutory tenures only 
severable for cause or (2) formally converting quasi-judicial offices within 
the DOJ, like OLC, into independent agencies. Shugerman, supra note 4.
82 United States Immigration Judge, 1990-2007, Adjunct Professor of Law, 
Pepperdine University School of Law in Malibu, California.
83 Professor of Law, University of Baltimore School of Law. See Garrett Epps, 
Why We Should Make Attorney General an Elective Office, SALON (Mar. 7, 
2007, 5:30 PM), https://www.salon.com/2007/03/09/attorney_general/; 
Garrett Epps, Picking the People’s Lawyer, SLATE (June 4, 2012, 5:01 PM), 
http://www.slate.com/articles/news_and_politics/the_hive/2012/06/
fixing_the_constitution_electing_the_attorney_general_.html.
84 State Attorneys Generals, KAISER FAMILY FOUNDATION, https://www.kff.org/
other/state-indicator/state-attorney-generals.
85 Bruce J. Einhorn, Time to Let the American People Elect the US Attorney 
General, HILL (June 20, 2017, 9:20 AM), https://thehill.com/blogs/pundits-
blog/the-administration/338536-its-time-we-let-the-american-people-
elect-the-us.
86 Wright, supra note 4, at 49.
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number of parties permitted to communicate about pending 
investigations has increased and decreased with each 
administration.87 
During the George W. Bush administration, the Gonzalez 
op-ed and growing backlash against the 2006 U.S. attorney 
terminations led the Senate Judiciary Committee to consider 
legislation “to provide for limitations in certain communications 
between the Department of Justice and the White House 
Office relating to civil and criminal investigations.”88 The initial 
Senate bill, Security from Political Interference in Justice Act 
of 2007, would have required communications about ongoing 
DOJ civil or criminal investigations to only include named senior 
Justice Department and White House officials or those they 
designate.89 The House released its own version of the bill, 
creating a reporting requirement on communications between 
the DOJ and the White House and prohibiting communications 
by non-covered personnel.90 The Senate committee 
subsequently adopted the House language but the bill never 
passed Congress.91 
After the Security from Political Interference in Justice Act 
failed to pass Congress, Attorney General Michael Mukasey 
unilaterally issued revised guidelines in December 2007 
that significantly narrowed the list of those permitted to 
communicate about ongoing matters.92 During the Obama 
administration, Attorney General Eric Holder further restricted 
87 See Wright, supra note 4. During the George W. Bush Administration, 
Attorneys General John Ashcroft and Alberto Gonzalez largely expanded 
the list beyond prior limits. The Clinton-era policy only allowed seven 
people to have initial contacts about pending cases—the president, vice 
president, White House counsel, deputy White House counsel, attorney 
general, deputy attorney general and associate attorney general. See Letter 
from Attorney General Janet Reno to Lloyd N. Cutler, Special Counsel 
to the President (Sept. 29, 1994). Attorney General Ashcroft amended 
the policy in 2002 to permit the Offices of the Attorney General, Deputy 
Attorney General, Vice President, White House Counsel, National Security 
Council and the Office of Homeland Security in their entireties, at least 
417 people at the White House and 42 DOJ officials, to communicate on 
non-national security related matters. See Memorandum from Attorney 
General John Ashcroft for Heads of Department Components and United 
States Attorneys (Apr. 15, 2002). Attorney General Gonzalez issued a 
new memorandum in 2006 adding the Office of Management and Budget 
as well as the Chief of Staff and Counsel to the Vice President to the list, 
swelling those permitted to communicate with the DOJ about pending 
investigations and cases to at least 895 people in the executive branch. 
See Memorandum from Attorney General Alberto Gonzales for Heads of 
Department Components and United States Attorneys (May 4, 2006).
88 S. 1845, 110th Cong. (2007).
89 Id.
90 See H.R. 3848, 110th Cong. § 3 (2007).
91 See S. 1845, 110th Cong. (2007); see also S. REP. NO. 110-203, at 7-8 (2007) 
(detailing legislative context).  
92 Michael B. Mukasey, U.S. Attorney General, Remarks Before the American 
Bar Association (Aug. 12, 2008). 
permissible “initial communications”93 and reiterated that 
the DOJ would only advise the White House on “pending or 
contemplated criminal or civil investigations or cases when—
but only when—it is important for the performance of the 
President’s duties and appropriate from a law enforcement 
perspective.”94 A memorandum from Trump’s first White 
House counsel, Donald F. McGahn, II, continued the Obama-
era restrictions “to ensure that DOJ exercises its investigatory 
and prosecutorial functions free from the fact or appearance of 
improper political influence.”95 
Support for various iterations of the Security from Political 
Interference in Justice Act has recently reemerged. For example, 
Protect Democracy proposed both codifying clear prohibitions 
on improper interference and requiring reporting of irregular 
contacts as priority interventions.96 Citizens for Responsibility 
and Ethics in Washington (“CREW”) has also signaled support 
for mandated reporting on communication.97 Finally, the 
Brennan Center Task Force on Democracy and the Rule of Law, 
which believes “Congress should not itself regulate how the 
executive branch deals with law enforcement,”98 proposed 
requiring the White House to publish policies on who can 
contact agencies and to maintain a log of covered contacts.99 
3. Proposals to Insulate U.S. Attorneys
Proposals to insulate U.S. attorneys existed prior to the 
Watergate scandal and 2006 U.S. attorney dismissal incident. 
For example, proposals to remove principal officers within the 
DOJ from partisan politics and direct presidential control were 
93 Initial communications were restricted to to the Attorney General and 
Deputy Attorney General at DOJ and the Counsel and Principal Deputy to 
the President, President and Vice President. Attorney General Eric Holder, 
Communications with the White House and Congress, Memorandum for 
Heads of Department Components & All U.S. Attorneys (May 11, 2009).
94 Id.; see also Memorandum from White House Counsel Kathryn Ruemmler 
for All White House Staff (Mar. 23, 2012).
95 Memorandum from White House Counsel Donald F. McGahn, II for 
All White House Staff (Jan. 27, 2017), https://www.politico.com/
f/?id=0000015a-dde8-d23c-a7ff-dfef4d530000
96 PROTECT DEMOCRACY, supra note 4, at 31.
97 CITIZENS FOR RESPONSIBILITY & ETHICS IN WASHINGTON, TRUMP-PROOFING THE 
PRESIDENCY: A PLAN FOR EXECUTIVE BRANCH ETHICS REFORM 38 (2018),  
https://www.citizen.org/wp-content/uploads/migration/trump_proofing_
the_presidency.pdf.
98 NAT’L TASK FORCE ON RULE OF LAW & DEMOCRACY, BRENNAN CENTER FOR JUSTICE, 
PROPOSALS FOR REFORM 18 (2018). 
99 Id.
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initially introduced in 1924 by Assistant Attorney General John 
Crim during President Warren G. Harding’s administration.100  
Following Watergate, Senator Lloyd Bentsen, a Democrat from 
Texas, also introduced legislation that would have prohibited 
any individual closely associated with the president, his or her 
100 Hearings Before the Select Committee on Investigation of the Attorney 
General, 68th Cong. (1924). These proposals were introduced in the wake 
of the Teapot Dome scandal, which led to the conviction of President 
Warren Harding’s secretary of the interior after he took bribes to lease 
petroleum reserves at low rates. Attorney General Harry M. Daugherty 
was investigated by Congress for his failure to investigate or prosecute 
the individuals who bribed the interior secretary. CLAYTON, supra note 33, at 
99. After the resignation of his predecessor James Howard McGrath, who 
was investigated for committing tax fraud, Truman’s last attorney general, 
James McGranery, similarly recommended Congress remove U.S. attorneys 
and other subordinate DOJ officials from partisan politics by making them 
part of the civil service. Investigation of the Department of Justice: Hearing 
Before the H. Comm. on the Judiciary, 82d Cong. (1952-1953).
campaign, or the political party apparatus that had supported 
his or her candidacy from serving in DOJ appointed offices 
and made the attorney general responsible for appointment 
and removal of United States attorneys.101 Though it passed 
the Senate in 1977, this bill was defeated in the House.102 
Alternatively, many scholars, like Sara Sun Beale,103 believe that 
the president should retain the authority to appoint individuals 
who share his or her priorities and remove those who fail to 
follow those priorities.104 
101 S. 3395, 93d Cong. (1975). See also 121 Cong. Rec. 33530 (1975). 
102 S. 1682, 94th Cong. (1977).
103 Charles L.B. Lowndes Professor, Duke Law School.
104 Sara Sun Beale, Rethinking the Identity and Role of United States Attorneys, 6 
OHIO ST. J. CRIM. L. 369, 431 (2009).
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The president’s powers over the DOJ are rooted primarily in two 
provisions of the Constitution’s Article II. The Executive Vesting 
Clause105 is central to the president’s administrative control over 
the DOJ while the Take Care Clause106 provides the basis for 
limiting the president’s undue influence over DOJ prosecutions 
and investigations by requiring the president act in good faith 
while executing the law.107 Together, the clauses establish the 
president’s preeminent role as the head of the executive branch 
of the federal government, granting the president the ability to 
shape law enforcement policies and supervise the conduct of 
other executive branch officials.108 There is disagreement about 
how, if at all, Article II operates to limit the president’s powers 
as chief executive.109 
The structure, history, and phrasing of the Take Care Clause 
support tying the president’s exercise of presidential power 
directly to the duties of his office.110 Based on this interpretation, 
this report recommends three proposals to limit undue White 
House interference in DOJ investigations and federal criminal 
prosecutions. Parts II.A, II.B, and II.C provide a theoretical 
framework for the proposals recommended in Part III and make 
clear that these proposals are anchored in the structure, history, 
and phrasing of the Take Care Clause. Part A argues that Article 
II, through the Take Care Clause, provides the basis for limiting 
presidential interference in DOJ investigations and prosecutions. 
Part B explains that it is Congress, not the president, that may 
determine how to carry the law into effect. Part C makes clear 
that because prosecutors act quasi-judicially, they must perform 
investigations impartially and without partisan motives. 
A.  A Duty to Take Care Does Not Mean 
“Take Care of It Yourself”
The framers chose the language of the Take Care Clause to 
address concerns about the scope of presidential power, 
especially with respect to carrying out administrative functions. 
At the Constitutional Convention of 1787, Dr. James McClurg 
expressed concerns over a phrase used in the “resolution 
105 The Executive Vesting Clause states, “[t]he executive Power shall be vested 
in a President of the United States of America.” U.S. CONST. art. II, § 1.
106 The Take Care Clause states that the President “shall take Care that the 
Laws be faithfully executed.” U.S. CONST. art. II, § 1.
107 COREY BRETTSCHNEIDER, THE OATH AND THE OFFICE 16-18 (2018).
108 Wright, supra note 4, at 27-28.
109 Lessig & Sunstein, supra note 16, at 8.
110 Id. 
respecting the national executive” (“the Resolution”).111 The 
Resolution proposed giving the president the “power to carry 
into execution the National Laws,” and Dr. McClurg worried 
about the scope of implied powers that could be construed 
from the phrase.112 He suggested it might be necessary for 
the Committee on Detail to “determine the means by which 
the executive is to carry the laws into effect, and to resist 
combinations [against the law].”113 The draft produced by the 
Committee on Detail addressed Dr. McClurg’s concerns by 
replacing the phrase “power to carry into execution the National 
Laws” with the language found in the Take Care Clause, 
requiring the president to “take Care that the Laws be faithfully 
executed.”114 By adopting the language of the Take Care Clause, 
the framers limited the scope of presidential power.115
The Take Care Clause was inspired by the history of the 
“faithful execution” of responsibilities by public and private 
officeholders.116 At the time of the Constitution’s framing, 
public and private officers were bound to “faithfully execute” 
their responsibilities by a duty of fidelity.117 Historically, the 
imposition of a duty of fidelity through the language of “faithful 
execution” on officeholders served three basic purposes: 
first, to ensure “true, honest, diligent, due, skillful, careful, 
good faith, and impartial execution” of their responsibilities; 
second, to prevent the abuse of discretion for the purposes of 
misappropriating profits; and, third, to prevent officeholders 
from acting outside the scope of their legal powers.118 In using 




115 U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2; Wright, supra note 4, at 29.
116 See Andrew Kent, Ethan J. Leib & Jed Handelsman Shugerman, ‘Faithful 
Execution’ and Article II, 132 HARV. L. REV. 2111, 2140 [hereinafter Faithful 
Execution] (noting that Take Care Clause and Presidential Oath Clause both 
share an element of faithful execution). See also U.S. CONST. art. II, §§ 2, 3. 
The “faithful execution” language also appears in the Presidential Oath. U.S. 
CONST. art. I, § 1, cl. 8.
117 See Faithful Execution, supra note 116, at 2181 (noting that “the project of 
fiduciary constitutionalism” needs to be “revised to accommodate the fact 
that the fiduciary obligations entailed by the Faithful Execution Clauses 
flow at least as much from the law of public office as they do from inchoate 
private fiduciary law from England”).
118 Id. at 2118 (explaining that the duty of fidelity had three basic components: 
(1) “faithful execution was repeatedly associated in statutes and other legal 
documents with true, honest, diligent, due, skillful, careful, good faith, and 
impartial execution of law or office”; (2) “the faithful execution duty was 
often imposed to prevent officeholders from misappropriating profits that 
the discretion inherent in their offices might afford them”; and (3) “the duty 
was imposed because of a concern that officers might act ultra vires”).
II. The Legality of Limiting Residential Influence Over 
Criminal Law Enforcement
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the language of faithful execution in Article II, the framers 
incorporated the duty of fidelity119 into the Constitution so the 
president, in exercising his or her executive power, would have 
a constitutional obligation to eschew self-interested action,120 
including actions motivated by partisanship.121 Thus, the 
Constitution’s command that the president “take Care that the 
Laws be faithfully executed” subordinates the president to the 
law122 and prevents him or her from acting beyond the scope of 
legal authority.123
The structure of Article II suggests the Executive Vesting Clause 
limits the president’s executive powers to carrying out the 
duties imposed on the president by the Take Care Clause.124 
The president’s duty to “take Care that the Laws be faithfully 
executed” can only be carried out because the “executive 
power” was vested in the presidency.125 The powers granted 
to the president exist solely for the purpose of executing his 
or her duties.126 The placement of the Take Care Clause in 
Article II, Section 3 of the Constitution, among a variety of other 
presidential duties,127 supports the understanding that the 
president’s duty to “faithfully execute” the law imposes a limit 
on the president’s executive authority by requiring the president 
act in good faith while carrying the law into execution.128
119 See id. at 2188 (noting that the “substantive original meaning of faithful 
execution” comprised “a no self-dealing restriction; a subordination of 
the President to the laws, barring ultra vires action; and a requirement of 
affirmative diligence and good faith.”).
120 See id. at 2120.
121 Admittedly, proving an individual’s subjective intent will be difficult, and the 
distinction between actions motivated by self-interest and those motivated 
by the “right” reasons will not always be easy to apply. Yet, given that the 
president’s faithful execution duties may, among others, include “no-bad 
faith, no self-dealing,” and the “impartial discharge of the duties of office,” 
the president’s duty to refrain from self-interested action would encompass 
the duty to avoid actions motivated by private political interests. See id. at 
9-10, 38.
122 U.S. CONST. art. II, §§ 2, 3.
123 Wright, supra note 4, at 30.
124 Brettschneider, supra note 107, at 17.
125 Id. 
126 Id.
127 “He shall from time to time give to the Congress Information of the State 
of the Union, and recommend to their Consideration such Measures as he 
shall judge necessary and expedient; he may, on extraordinary Occasions, 
convene both Houses, or either of them, and in Case of Disagreement 
between them, with Respect to the Time of Adjournment, he may adjourn 
them to such Time as he shall think proper; he shall receive Ambassadors 
and other public Ministers; he shall take Care that the Laws be faithfully 
executed, and shall Commission all the Officers of the United States.” U.S. 
CONST. art. II, §§ 2, 3.
128 Article II, Section 2 articulates most of the president’s powers. The Take 
Care Clause, however, is found in Article II, Section 3 alongside a variety of 
other presidential duties. Lessig & Sunstein, supra note 16, at 62.
B.  Congress Can Set the Standard for 
“Faithful Execution”
While revising the language of the Take Care Clause, the 
framers also modified the language now found in the Necessary 
and Proper Clause to empower Congress, not the president, 
to supplement the powers of the federal government.129 The 
Necessary and Proper Clause gives Congress the power 
to “make all laws which shall be necessary and proper for 
carrying into Execution” any of the powers vested in the U.S. 
government.130 The framers conferred onto the legislative 
branch a power that was substantially similar to the “power 
to carry into execution the National Laws,” a power that was 
deliberately not granted to the president at the Constitutional 
Convention of 1787.131 Thus, where a law is required to 
supplement the powers of the federal government, it is 
Congress, acting through the Necessary and Proper Clause, not 
the president, that supplements that power and determines 
how it is to be exercised.132 
Through the Necessary and Proper Clause, Congress plays a 
significant role in determining how the president can “faithfully 
execute” the laws. In Marbury v. Madison,133 the Supreme Court 
discussed the degree to which Congress could control the 
executive’s administrative function.134 The controversy reviewed 
in Marbury arose when President Thomas Jefferson, shortly 
after entering office, ordered Secretary of State James Madison 
to withhold the judicial commission of William Marbury, a 
last-minute appointee of outgoing President John Adams.135 
In Marbury, the Court explained that executive officers can 
potentially act in two different capacities: as agents of the 
president and as agents of the law.136 Executive officers who 
129 Id.
130 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8.
131 Lessig & Sunstein, supra note 16, at 62. James Madison, a proponent of 
the “carry into execution” language, believed the phrase would give the 
president the power to execute the laws as well as the implied power to 
define how the laws would be “carried into effect.” Id. at 65.
132 Id. at 67; see also Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579, 
588 (1952) (noting that “[t]he President’s order does not direct that a 
congressional policy be executed in a manner prescribed by Congress—it 
directs that a presidential policy be executed in a manner prescribed 
by the President.”). In his concurrence, Justice Frankfurter noted that 
“unenumerated powers do not mean undefined powers. The separation 
of powers built into our Constitution gives essential content to undefined 
provisions in the frame of our government.” Id. at 610 (Frankfurter, J., 
concurring).
133 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137 (1803). 
134 Id. 
135 Id.
136 Lessig & Sunstein, supra note 16, at 56.
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exercise power legally vested in the president by law (i.e., by the 
Constitution or Congress), either at the president’s command 
or on his behalf, act as agents of the president.137 When 
executive officers act pursuant to authority granted to them by 
Congress, they act as agents of the law.138 Thus, an executive 
officer adhering to statutorily created responsibilities, such as 
a prosecutor deciding whether to commence a prosecution 
against an individual based on legal criteria established by 
Congress, acts as an agent of the law, and must do as the  
law commands, the president’s direction notwithstanding.139  
A prosecutor must, therefore, exercise prosecutorial discretion 
on an individual basis independent of any direct presidential 
command.
C.  Prosecutors Are Controlled 
Only by the Law
Prosecutors, who act “quasi-judicially,” must engage in objective 
and non-partisan decision-making. The work of prosecutors 
has been described as “quasi-judicial” because prosecutors are 
expected to pursue justice independent of political concerns.140 
In a series of cases, the Supreme Court has recognized that 
when executive officers have a duty to make decisions that 
affect the liberty interests of individuals, the discharge of 
that duty takes on a quasi-judicial character.141 Further, when 
the liberty interests of an individual are at stake, due process 
requires the government to follow fair and neutral procedures.142 
For example, decisions made by criminal law enforcement 
officials related to initiating investigations, seeking grand jury 
indictments, dismissing or filing of charges, and offering plea 
bargains require the government to follow fair and neutral 
137 Marbury, 5 U.S. at 165-66; Lessig & Sunstein, supra note 16, at 57.
138 Id. As used here, “an agent of the law” carries the same meaning as “officer 
of the law” (the terminology originally used in Marbury). Marbury, 5 U.S. 
at 166. We altered the terminology to avoid confusion, as in the modern 
lexicon “officer of the law” is closely associated with police officers.
139 Lessig & Sunstein, supra note 16, at 55-57. In Kendall v. United States, the 
Supreme Court held that Congress could vest executive officials with 
the power to act independently of the president—Congress may require 
executive officials to answer to the law rather than the president: “There 
are certain political duties imposed upon many officers in the executive 
department, the discharge of which is under the direction of the President. 
But it would be an alarming doctrine, that congress cannot impose 
upon any executive officer any duty they may think proper, which is not 
repugnant to any rights secured and protected by the constitution; and 
in such cases, the duty and responsibility grow out of and are subject to 
the control of the law, and not to the direction of the President. And this 
is emphatically the case, where the duty enjoined is of a mere ministerial 
character.” Kendall v. United States ex rel. Stokes, 37 U.S. 524, 610 (1838).
140 Can the President Control, supra note 4, at 23.
141 See Myers v. United States, 272 U.S. 52, 135 (1926); see generally Goldberg 
v. Kelley, 397 U.S. 254 (1970); Mathews v. Eldridge 424 U.S. 319 (1976).
142 See generally Goldberg, 397 U.S. 254.
procedures.143 These discretionary decisions affect individual 
liberty interests and are made only after the prosecutor has 
heard or reviewed relevant evidence and arguments.144
Because of the individual liberty interest at stake, the DOJ has 
established a series of guidelines on prosecutorial discretion 
to “promote the reasoned exercise of prosecutorial authority 
and contribute to the fair, evenhanded administration of the 
federal criminal laws.”145 The DOJ published these guidelines 
recognizing that “the consequences for those accused of 
criminal wrongdoing, crime victims, and their families whether 
or not a conviction ultimately results.”146 These guidelines divide 
the prosecutorial process into several stages, each of which is 
governed by a unique set of criteria.147 For example, Title 9-27 of 
the DOJ Guidelines sets forth the requirements for conducting 
an investigation,148 grounds for commencing prosecution,149 
the standards for pursuing charges,150 and the importance 
143 Can The President Control, supra note 4, at 23.
144 Id.; Gerard E. Lynch, Our Administrative System of Criminal Justice, 66 
FORDHAM L. REV. 2117, 2125 (1998).
145 DEP’T OF JUST., JUSTICE MANUAL § 9-27.001, https://www.justice.gov/jm/jm-9-
27000-principles-federal-prosecution.
146 Id.
147 Id. at § 9-27.
148 Id. at § 9-27.200 (“If the attorney for the government concludes that 
there is probable cause to believe that a person has committed a federal 
offense within his/her jurisdiction, he/she should consider whether 
to: (1) Request or conduct further investigation; (2)Commence or 
recommend prosecution; (3) Decline prosecution and refer the matter for 
prosecutorial consideration in another jurisdiction; (4) Decline prosecution 
and commence or recommend pretrial diversion or other non-criminal 
disposition; or (5) Decline prosecution without taking other action.”).
149 Id. at § 9-27.220 (“The attorney for the government should commence 
or recommend federal prosecution if he/she believes that the person’s 
conduct constitutes a federal offense, and that the admissible evidence 
will probably be sufficient to obtain and sustain a conviction, unless (1) the 
prosecution would serve no substantial federal interest; (2) the person is 
subject to effective prosecution in another jurisdiction; or (3) there exists 
an adequate non-criminal alternative to prosecution.”).
150 Id. at § 9-27.230 (“In determining whether a prosecution would serve 
a substantial federal interest, the attorney for the government should 
weigh all relevant considerations, including: (1) Federal law enforcement 
priorities, including any federal law enforcement initiatives or operations 
aimed at accomplishing those priorities; (2) The nature and seriousness 
of the offense; (3) The deterrent effect of prosecution; (4) The person’s 
culpability in connection with the offense; (5) The person’s history with 
respect to criminal activity; (6) The person’s willingness to cooperate 
in the investigation or prosecution of others; (7) The person’s personal 
circumstances; (8) The interests of any victims; and (9) The probable 
sentence or other consequences if the person is convicted.”); id. at 
§ 9-27.260 (“In determining whether to commence or recommend 
prosecution or take other action against a person, the attorney for the 
government should not be influenced by: (1) The person’s race, religion, 
gender, ethnicity, national origin, sexual orientation, or political association, 
activities, or beliefs; (2) The attorney’s own personal feelings concerning 
the person, the person’s associates, or the victim; or (3) The possible 
affect of the decision on the attorney’s own professional or personal 
circumstances.”).
16 Toward an Independent Administration of Justice
of maintaining disinterestedness throughout the process.151 
The DOJ Guidelines show that decisions related to criminal 
law enforcement are the culmination of an agency decision 
making process, which has immediate and appreciable legal 
consequences.152 An individual’s due process rights therefore 
limit the ability of government officials, even the president, 
to interfere with the objective decision-making processes 
associated with enforcement of criminal laws.153
Prosecutors are bound by their oath, even when multiple duties 
come into conflict with one another. The laws, regulations, and 
rules of professional conduct require federal prosecutors to 
act as advocates for the executive branch, while also imposing 
a duty to “seek justice.”154 This duty requires prosecutors 
to ensure that defendants have fair and impartial trials.155 
151 Id. at § 9-27.001.
152 See generally Bennett v. Spear, 520 U.S. 154 (1997).
153 PROTECT DEMOCRACY, supra note 4, at 17.
154 See MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 3.8 CMT. 1; Bruce A. Green, Why 
Should Prosecutors “Seek Justice”?, 26 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 607, 625 (1999) 
[hereinafter Seek Justice] (explaining that justifications for the duty to 
seek justice could be rooted in the prosecutor’s power or the prosecutor’s 
professional role as representative of the sovereign). 
155 Berger v. United States, 295 U.S. 78, 88 (1935) (“The United States 
Attorney is the representative not of an ordinary party to a controversy, but 
of a sovereign whose obligation to govern impartially is as compelling as 
its obligation to govern at all; and whose interest, therefore, in a criminal 
prosecution is not that it shall win a case, but that justice shall be done. As 
such, he is in a peculiar and very definite sense the servant of the law, the 
twofold aim of which is that guilt should not escape or innocence suffer. He 
may prosecute with earnestness and vigor—indeed, he should do so. But 
while he may strike hard blows, he is not at liberty to strike foul ones. It is 
as much his duty to refrain from improper methods calculated to produce a 
wrongful conviction as it is to use every legitimate means to bring about a 
just one.”). See, e.g., People v. Lee Chuck, 78 Cal. 317, 330 (Cal. 1889); Seek 
Justice, supra note 154, at 613-14.
In contrast to a lawyer practicing in the private sector, a 
prosecutor must take into account the public interest,156 
while simultaneously zealously advocating157 on behalf of the 
executive branch.158 A significant tension may arise if federal 
prosecutors are ordered by White House officials—including 
the president—to act in a manner that is contrary to the public 
interest. DOJ prosecutors may turn to their oath of office to 
resolve this tension because, while they must act as advocates 
for the executive branch, prosecutors cannot violate their own 
oath to “support and defend the Constitution” and to “faithfully 
discharge the duties of the office.”159 
156 See Berger, 295 U.S. at 88, Seek Justice, supra note 154, at 614.
157 See MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT pmbl. 2 (“As advocate, a lawyer zealously 
asserts the client’s position under the rules of the adversary system”).
158 Michael I. Krauss, The Lawyer as Limo: A Brief History of the Hired Gun, 8 U. 
CHI. L. SCH. ROUNDTABLE 325 (2001). The identity of the government lawyer’s 
client is contested. See Note, Rethinking the Professional Responsibilities 
of Federal Agency Lawyers, 115 HARV. L. REV. 1170, 1180-81 (2002) (noting 
that to the question of who the government lawyer’s client is, “legitimate 
potential answers” are “the government generally, the agency, the 
President, the public interest—each of which describes a part of the 
government lawyer’s role” and that the “identity of the client is inherently 
indeterminate”); Seek Justice, supra note 154, at 633 (”A lawyer serving 
in the role as criminal prosecutor is distinguished by the identity of the 
client, the amount of authority delegated to the lawyer to act on behalf of 
the client and the nature of the client’s interests and ends in the criminal 
context.”).
159 5 U.S.C. § 3331 (2016). 
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The following three proposals are designed to prohibit actions 
motivated by personal animus or self-interest that are aimed at 
influencing decisions related to the criminal law enforcement 
process.160 The proposals are not intended to impede the 
president’s right to set enforcement priorities and to intervene 
in matters relating to core executive functions, such as 
protecting the security of the United States from foreign threats. 
Proposal 1 recommends that Congress enact legislation clearly 
stating the president and White House officials cannot exercise 
influence over any decision related to the investigation or 
prosecution of any individual, except where a core executive 
function is implicated. Proposal 2(a) recommends that 
Congress enact legislation codifying the DOJ’s Justice Manual 
guidelines related to investigations, prosecutions, and and 
charging decisions in order to emphasize that prosecutors 
must follow the law above all else. Proposals 2(b) recommends 
Congress create duties for prosecutors in situations where 
the president or other White House officials order them 
to contravene their statutory duties. In those situations, 
prosecutors should have duties to not resign and to report the 
unlawful order. Proposal 3 recommends Congress empower the 
Office of Government Ethics to gradually define the parameters 
of non-financial conflicts of interest that require recusal of DOJ 
employees from certain matters.
Reform Proposal 1: Specifically prohibit 
the president from interfering in the law 
enforcement function of the DOJ.
Congress should enact legislation prohibiting White 
House officials, including the president, from requesting 
or demanding, either directly or indirectly, any officer or 
employee of the DOJ to commence, terminate, or otherwise 
influence any investigation, prosecution, or charging decision 
related to the criminal liability of a particular person, except 
where the discharge of core executive functions, such as 
defending against national security threats, makes such 
actions permissible. The legislation should make clear that 
while non-DOJ officials may not direct or interfere with 
any criminal law enforcement process, such officials may 
refer matters to the DOJ for investigation and, if necessary, 
participate in DOJ prosecutions as witnesses.161 
160 Preventing actions motivated by self-interest is consistent with the 
president’s duty to see that the laws are “faithfully executed” as this 
encompasses the principles of good faith and that, under the rule of law “no 
man should be his own judge.” See generally United States v. Armstrong, 517 
U.S. 456 (1996).
161 This proposal is influenced by and substantially similar to a proposal put 
forward by the organization Protect Democracy. See PROTECT DEMOCRACY, 
supra note 4, at 31.
Proposal 1 specifically focuses on preventing White House 
personnel from exercising any undue influence in the criminal 
law enforcement process. Focusing on the acquired executive 
function of criminal law enforcement, Proposal 1 creates a 
clear line that the president and other White House officials 
cannot cross. The proposal only targets the acquired functions 
granted to the executive by Congress. Therefore, Congress 
can direct how the president is to carry those functions into 
effect.162 This proposal also preserves the president’s ability 
to set law enforcement priorities.163 As the chief executive, 
the president plays a legitimate role in prioritizing certain 
categories of criminal law enforcement as a matter of public 
policy.164 In setting enforcement priorities, the president weighs 
a number of factors, such as resource constraints, conflicting 
congressional mandates, and deterrence.165 But Congress may 
appropriately limit the president’s ability to determine the 
outcome of individual cases so long as the president’s power to 
set enforcement priorities is retained. 
While the president may continue to set enforcement priorities, 
he may not interfere with federal investigations or criminal 
prosecutions of specific individuals. In Morrison v. Olson, the 
Supreme Court considered the validity of an independent 
prosecutor appointed, pursuant to the Ethics in Government 
Act of 1978, to investigate, and, if necessary, prosecute 
government officials for their roles in the Iran-Contra affair.166 
The Court determined the Ethics in Government Act did not 
violate the separation of powers doctrine because it did not 
interfere with the core functions of the executive branch and 
did not diminish the power of the executive branch.167 The 
Supreme Court did not regard prosecutorial decision-making as 
a core executive function. Instead, it supported the proposition 
that prosecutorial decision-making is an acquired executive 
function.168 A congressional mandate explicitly prohibiting 
presidential and White House interference in specific criminal 
162 See supra note 141.
163 See generally Armstrong, 517 U.S. 456.
164 Can The President Control, supra note 4, at 6.
165 Enforcement of Immigration Law provides an illustrative example. 
Immigration agencies have the ability to pursue approximately 400,000 
deportation cases a year, roughly 4% of the undocumented population in 
the U.S. While the law provides that persons without documentation are 
subject to deportation, Congress has also mandated that certain classes 
of aliens, such as those who have committed violent crimes, be prioritized 
for deportation. See Memorandum from Jeh Johnson, Homeland Security 
Secretary, to Leon Rodriguez, Director U.S. Citizenship and Immigration 
Services, Thomas S. Winkowski, Acting Director U.S. Immigration and 
Customs Enforcement, and R. Gil Kerlikowske, Commissioner U.S. Customs 
and Border Protection (Nov. 20, 2014). 
166 See Morrison v. Olson, 487 U.S. 654 (1998).
167 Id. at 679, 691; Can the President Control, supra note 4, at 6. 
168 See generally Morrison, 487 U.S. 654 (1998).
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prosecutions is consistent with the holding in Morrison, so long 
as the mandate does not prevent the president from performing 
his or her core executive functions.169
The legislation should be modeled after 26 U.S.C. § 7217, 
which was enacted in response to President Nixon’s use of the 
International Revenue Service to target his political enemies. 
Section 7217 prohibits certain executive branch officials, 
including the president, vice president, and members of their 
staffs from “request[ing], directly or indirectly, any officer 
or employee of the Internal Revenue Service to conduct or 
terminate an audit or other investigation of any particular 
taxpayer with respect to the tax liability of such taxpayer.”170 
The legislation, however, should permit non-DOJ officials 
to refer matters to the DOJ for possible investigation. If it 
is determined that the matter referred to the DOJ warrants 
criminal investigation, the DOJ may call upon the official who 
made the referral to testify as a witness during the investigation 
or prosecution.  
Proposal 1 could raise concerns related to democratic 
accountability and uniform enforcement of the law. Democratic 
accountability concerns are raised whenever individuals 
within the federal government are put beyond the control of 
elected officeholders.171 Uniform enforcement concerns might 
arise if prosecutors pursue different enforcement priorities.172 
Both concerns are accounted for in Proposal 1. Democratic 
accountability is preserved under Proposal 1 because the 
proposal does not affect the president’s ability to remove 
prosecutors.173  
The president’s ability to set uniform enforcement priorities 
or shift enforcement priorities in response to changing 
circumstances would also be unaffected under Proposal 1. By 
focusing on the process of prosecution rather than the policies 
of prosecution, prosecutors would remain bound to follow the 
president’s general enforcement directives.174 The president’s 
ability to set enforcement priorities will allow him or her to 
continue to “supervise and guide [the] construction of the 
statutes under which [the DOJ] act[s] in order to secure that 
unitary and uniform execution of the laws.”175 
169 Id.
170 26 U.S.C. § 7217; PROTECT DEMOCRACY, supra note 4, at 31.
171 See generally Free Enterprise Fund v. PCAOB, 561 U.S. 477 (2010).
172 PROTECT DEMOCRACY, supra note 4, at 24.
173 See generally Free Enterprise Fund, 561 U.S. 477.
174 See ELLIOT RICHARDSON, THE CREATIVE BALANCE 27 (1976) (noting the distinction 
between the “proper role of the political process in the shaping of legal 
policies and the perversion of the legal process by political pressure”). 
175 Myers v. United States, 272 U.S. 52, 135 (1926); see also Can the President 
Control, supra note 4, at 53.
Reform Proposal 2: Prohibit prosecutors 
from acting on undue White House 
directives related to specific criminal 
matters and create a duty for prosecutors 
not to resign in the face of unlawful White 
House interference and to report any such 
interference.
(a)  Congress should enact legislation that codifies DOJ Justice 
Manual guidelines related to investigations, prosecutions, 
and charging decisions. The statutory expansion must 
reinforce the prosecutor’s duty to faithfully execute the 
laws by specifically stating that prosecutors, when making 
decisions or exercising discretion related to specific 
criminal prosecutions, are agents of the law and must do 
as the law commands, instructions from the president or 
other White House officials notwithstanding.176 
(b)  The congressional enactment should also clarify that 
prosecutors have an affirmative duty not to resign if the 
president or another White House official demands the 
prosecutor take action that would violate his or her duties 
under the law. Any prosecutor who receives an improper 
command under this law must also report the command 
to the DOJ’s Inspector General.
Proposal 2 aims to address instances in which a president or 
another White House official issues orders or instructions that 
put the prosecutor’s responsibility to advocate for the executive 
into conflict with the prosecutor’s duty to “seek justice.”177  
In such instances, Proposal 2(a) clarifies that prosecutors 
cannot consider the order or instruction when making decisions 
related to any phase of the criminal law enforcement process.  
Title 9-27 of the DOJ’s Justice Manual recognizes several 
unique stages of the criminal law enforcement process 
and provides specific criteria to guide decisions related to 
176 This reform would rely on the distinction made in Marbury, which the Court 
further elaborated on in Kendall, where it stated,
But it by no means follows, that every officer in every branch of that 
department is under the exclusive direction of the president. Such a 
principle, we apprehend, is not, and certainly cannot be claimed by 
the president. There are certain political duties imposed upon many 
officers in the executive department, the discharge of which is under 
the direction of the president. But it would be an alarming doctrine, that 
congress cannot impose upon any executive officer any duty they may 
think proper, which is not repugnant to any rights secured and protected 
by the Constitution; and in such cases, the duty and responsibility grow 
out of and are subject to the control of the law, and not to the direction 
of the president.
 Kendall, 37 U.S. at 610 (1838).
177 See supra Part II.
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investigations, prosecutions, and the charging of offenses.178 
This listing in the Justice Manual, and the Justice Manual as a 
whole, are notable because they lend support to the proposition 
that prosecutors execute a quasi-judicial function.179 This 
proposition is further supported by the Justice Manual’s 
preamble, where it notes that the commencement of criminal 
enforcement proceedings against an individual can have severe 
consequences on that individual’s liberty interests.180 Yet, courts 
have held that violations of DOJ guidelines bear little legal 
significance.181 Because the Justice Manual specifically provides 
that it “does not create substantive or procedural rights 
enforceable by others,” persons who fall victim to guideline 
violations are left without judicial recourse.182 A congressional 
enactment based on Proposal 2(a), that codifies the factors 
specified in Title 9-27 of the Justice Manual,183 would link the 
prosecutor’s quasi-judicial responsibilities to the statutory 
powers of their office, thereby giving legal recourse to persons 
who are improperly subjected to criminal law enforcement 
processes.
Currently, 28 U.S.C. § 516 vests the power to conduct 
investigations and litigation in officers of the DOJ, subject to the 
direction of the attorney general. While the statute empowers 
the DOJ to conduct investigations and litigation on behalf of 
the federal government, it does not explicitly state that DOJ 
officers and the attorney general must exercise these powers 
independently of the president. Codifying the criteria specified 
in Title 9-27 of the Justice Manual will clarify that DOJ officials 
function as agents of the law when making decisions related to 
the criminal law enforcement process and must therefore do 
as the law commands, even if this means defying a presidential 
directive.184
Proposal 2(b) calls for the attorney general and prosecutors, as 
agents of the law, to refuse to uphold orders from White House 
officials that seek to impede, influence, or interfere with a 
178 See generally JUSTICE MANUAL, supra note 145.
179 Lynch, supra note 144. 
180 See JUSTICE MANUAL, supra note 145.
181 See United States v. Lee, 274 F.3d 484, 493 (8th Cir. 2001). See generally 
Nichols v. Reno, 124 F.3d 1376 (10th Cir. 1997); United States v. Busher, 817 
F.2d 1409, 1411-12 (9th Cir. 1987). Cf. United States v. Craveiro, 907 F.2d 
260, 264 (1st Cir. 1990).
182 See JUSTICE MANUAL, supra note 145, at § 1-1.200.
183 See supra Part II.C.
184 See supra Part II.B.
criminal investigation.185 In the absence of a clear congressional 
mandate, refusing to uphold an order could present a dilemma 
for the attorney general or prosecutor. He or she may view 
an attorney general’s or a prosecutor’s role as an agent of the 
law as being in conflict with their role as an advocate for the 
executive branch.186 The attorney general or prosecutor may 
even be pressured into resigning if he or she refuses to obey 
a presidential command.187 Congress must make clear that in 
instances where an attorney general or prosecutor is ordered 
to obstruct, impede, or interfere with a criminal investigation, 
the attorney general or prosecutor has an affirmative duty not 
to resign and must refuse to uphold the order.188 Furthermore, 
the attorney general or prosecutor receiving the order should 
be required to detail the matter in writing and explain why he or 
she believes the president violated the duty to faithfully execute 
the law. The attorney general or prosecutor must then transmit 
the explanation to the DOJ’s inspector general, and possibly to 
Congress, for an investigation.
Proposal 2 is likely to raise concerns about democratic 
accountability and the president’s ability to respond to 
widespread criminal conduct by changing enforcement 
priorities. However, Proposal 2 maintains democratic 
accountability by preserving the president’s ability to remove 
prosecutors.189 
185 See id. (“As defined by statute and precedent, the crime of obstruction 
occurs when an individual ‘corruptly’ endeavors to impede or influence an 
investigation or other proceeding, and the word ‘corruptly’ is understood to 
mean ‘with an improper purpose.’”). 
186 See supra Part II.C.
187 See supra notes 49-52.
188 See Faithful Execution, supra note 116, at 65 (“The seemingly discretionary 
pardon power in Section 2 may similarly be curtailed by the duty of faithful 
execution, prohibiting (at least) self-pardons. And it may also restrict the 
President’s power to dismiss officials for primarily self-protective purposes 
against the public interest, especially given that removal power is not 
explicitly mentioned in the text while the requirement of faithful execution 
is, doubly.”). Sally Yates, who considered President Trump’s ban on travel 
from certain majority-Muslim nations to be illegal, wrote to DOJ attorneys 
stating, 
I am responsible for ensuring that the positions we take in court remain 
consistent with this institution’s solemn obligation to always seek justice 
and stand for what is right. At present, I am not convinced that the 
defense of the Executive Order is consistent with these responsibilities 
nor am I convinced that the Executive Order is lawful. Consequently, for 
as long as I am the Acting Attorney general, the Department of Justice 
will not present arguments in defense of the Executive Order, unless 
and until I become convinced that it is appropriate to do so.
 Letter from Sally Yates, Acting Attorney General (Jan. 30, 2017), https://
www.nytimes.com/interactive/2017/01/30/us/document-Letter-From-
Sally-Yates.html.
189 See Free Enterprise Fund, 561 U.S. at 697-98.
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Additionally, Proposal 2 does not interfere with the president’s 
ability to direct resources for criminal investigations. It is not 
unreasonable to assume that situations may arise where 
widespread criminal conduct may lead a president to request 
that the attorney general take legitimate, robust action.190 
For this reason, Proposal 2 is designed to protect prosecutors 
from undue influence only when they are making criminal law 
enforcement decisions related to specific individuals. As such, 
Proposal 2 maintains the president’s power to shift general 
enforcement priorities in response to changing circumstances 
and requests proactive investigatory action from the DOJ when 
it relates to widespread criminal activity.191 
Reform Proposal 3: Mandatory recusal for 
DOJ employees and o!cials where private 
and personal considerations conflict with 
the public interest.
Congress should enact legislation mandating DOJ officials 
report to the Office of Governmental Ethics (“OGE”) all 
personal or private interests that might conflict with the 
public interest when they are involved with any aspect of the 
criminal law enforcement process. Further, the legislation 
should mandate that DOJ officials must recuse themselves 
from all aspects of a relevant case when the OGE has 
determined personal or private interests pose a “significant 
risk” to public interest. Congress should permit the OGE to 
interpret the term “significant risk.”  
Proposal 3 is designed to allow the OGE to gradually determine 
what type of non-financial conflicts of interest might interfere 
with the prosecutor’s duty to the public interest. Prosecutors 
are required to support and defend the Constitution while also 
seeking justice in an impartial fashion.192 Because prosecutors 
190 See Can The President Control, supra note 4, at 13. See also Barack Obama, 
The President’s Role in Advancing Criminal Justice Reform, 130 HARV. L. REV. 811, 
823 (2017) (“[P]articular criminal matters are not directed by the President 
personally but are handled by career prosecutors and law enforcement 
officials who are dedicated to serving the public and promoting public 
safety. The President does not and should not decide who or what to 
investigate or prosecute or when an investigation or prosecution should 
happen.”).
191 See Barack Obama, President, United States of America, State of the Union 
Address (Jan. 24, 2012) (“I’m asking my Attorney General to create a 
special unit of federal prosecutors and leading state attorneys general to 
expand our investigations into the abusive lending and packaging of risky 
mortgages that led to the housing crisis”). 
192 See, e.g., Young v. United States ex. rel. Vuitton et Fils S.A., 481 U.S. 787, 814 
(1987); Bruce A. Green & Rebecca Roiphe, Rethinking Prosecutors’ Conflicts of 
Interest, 58 B.C. L. REV. 463, 471 (2017) [hereinafter Rethinking Prosecutors’ 
Conflicts].
make decisions that affect defendants while also accounting 
for the public interest, a prosecutor may be deemed to have 
a fiduciary duty to the public.193 Adhering to their duty to the 
public requires prosecutors to neither further their own personal 
interests nor to further the private interests of others.194 
Thus, in instances when a prosecutor is acting pursuant to 
a presidential order and commences a criminal proceeding 
against the president’s political adversaries, not only does the 
president violate his or her fiduciary duty for ordering such a 
prosecution,195 the prosecutor also violates his or her duty to 
seek justice in a disinterested fashion.196 In such an instance, 
the prosecutor violates his or her duty to the public interest 
because the law enforcement process was motivated by the 
private interests of the president.197 
The American Bar Association’s Model Rules of Professional 
Conduct state that a conflict of interest exists where there is a 
“significant risk” that a lawyer’s ability to consider, recommend, 
or carry out an appropriate course of action for his or her 
client will be “materially limited” as a result of the lawyer’s 
other responsibilities or interests.198 The Commentary on 
the Model Rules states that determining what constitutes a 
“significant risk” is not dependent on “[t]he mere possibility of 
subsequent harm” to the lawyer’s client. Instead, the focus is 
on “the likelihood that a difference in interests will eventuate” 
and whether those interests will “materially interfere with the 
lawyer’s independent professional judgment” in considering 
alternatives or pursuing reasonable courses of action on behalf 
of the client.
Defining non-financial conflicts of interest that pose a 
“significant risk” to prosecutors’ ability to act in the public 
interest does present some difficulties. Because prosecutors 
function within a bureaucratic governmental institution, a 
prosecutor’s conflict could arise out of “any personal belief, 
ambition or institutional interest” that undermines the 
prosecutor’s ability to conduct prosecution in a disinterested 
manner.199 At the federal level, conflict of interest guidelines 
have rarely ventured beyond defining the scope of financial 
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and legal conflicts of interest.200 Additionally, disciplinary 
authorities at both the state and federal level have been 
unwilling to directly address what amounts to a non-financial 
or institutional conflict of interest.201 For example, a federal 
appeals court rejected a grievance filed against Independent 
Counsel Kenneth Starr alleging that Starr’s ties to conservative 
Republicans compromised his ability to remain disinterested 
while investigating Democratic President Bill Clinton’s role in 
the Whitewater scandal.202 In rejecting the claim, a concurring 
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judge noted that a court’s application of “vague standards such 
as political conflict of interest” would result in politicization of 
the judiciary and further “weaken legitimate efforts to weed 
out” misconduct in the government. 
Despite these difficulties, Congress should enact legislation 
requiring all DOJ officials to report any personal or private 
interests that might conflict with the public interest when they 
are involved with any aspect of criminal law enforcement. The 
legislation should mandate that any person whose interests 
are deemed to be a “significant risk” by the OGE must recuse 
himself or herself from involvement with the case at hand. 
The OGE should define “significant risk” through rulemaking 
and case-by-case adjudication. Allowing the OGE to define 
“significant risk” through rulemaking and adjudications will 
allow the agency to develop appropriate standards over time 
while also permitting the agency to adjust the definition as 
needed.203 
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Conclusion
The Watergate scandal led to the downfall of President Nixon, 
but not America’s constitutional democracy. Instead, Watergate 
initiated a series of reforms that not only strengthened our 
institutions, but also established new norms designed to guide 
the ethical judgments of government actors. The current 
moment, which has drawn comparisons to the Watergate era, 
presents another opportunity for exploring the deficiencies and 
clarifying misunderstandings in the law. 
The reforms in this report would strengthen our nation’s 
institutions and the obligations of legal professionals to serve 
as a check on the president’s powers. It is not unusual for a 
president to attempt to expand the boundary of executive 
power. However, when a president attempts to expand his or 
her executive power, scholars and the public should evaluate 
whether such an increase in executive power is in the best 
interest of the nation.

